Bibliography+-+Public+&+Private+Strategy

=CORE READINGS=

Public Politics

 * 1) Baron, David P. 1999. “Integrated Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Client and Interest Group Politics,” //Business and Politics// 1(1): 1-31.
 * 2) Ansolabehere, Stephen, John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder (2003). “Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?” //Journal of Economic Perspectives// 17: 105-130.

Private Politics

 * 1) Baron, David P., and Daniel Diermeier. 2007. “Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy,” //Journal of Economics and Management Strategy// 16(3): 599-634.
 * 2) Eesley, Chuck, and Michael Lenox . 2006. “Firm Responses to Secondary Stakeholder Action.” // Strategic Management Journal // 27(8): 765-782

International Non-Market Political Strategy

 * 1) Iaryczower, Matias Pablo T. Spiller and Mariano Tommasi (2006). “Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation.” American Political Science Review, 100:85-97.
 * 2) Fisman, Ray. 2001. “Estimating the Value of Political Connections,” //American Economic Review// 91: 1095-1102.

=SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS=

Overview

 * 1) Baron, David. (2010). //Business and Its Environment, 6th Ed.// Chapter 1.
 * 2) This is the standard MBA textbook in the field.
 * 3) Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, and Dennis Yao (2008). “Integrated Strategies.” Harvard Business School Working Paper.
 * 4) de Figueiredo, John M. (2009). “Integrated Political Strategy,” //Advances in Strategic Management//, forthcoming.

Institutional Detail: Background and Early Papers

 * 1) Olson Mancur 1965. //The Logic of Collective Action//. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press)
 * 2) Tsebelis, George. 2002. //Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work//. Princeton: Princeton University Press
 * 3) Schattschneider, E. E. 1935. //Politics, Pressures and the Tariff//. New York: Prentice-Hall.
 * 4) Stigler, George (1971). “The Economic Theory of Regulation,” //Bell Journal of Economics// 3: 3-18.
 * 5) Peltzman, Sam (1976). “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics 19(2): 211-240.
 * 6) Yoffie, David. 1988. “How an Industry Builds Political Advantage,” //Harvard Business Review// (May-June): 82-89.
 * 7) Spulber, Daniel. 1989. //Regulation and Markets//. Cambridge: MIT Press.
 * 8) Baron, David P. 1995. “The Non-Market Strategy System,” //Sloan Management Review// 37(1): 73-85.
 * 9) Baron, David P. 1995. “Integrated Strategy: Market and Non-Market Components,” //California Management Review//: 47-65.

Theory

 * 1) Hillman, Amy J., Gerald D. Keim & Douglas A. Schuler. 2004. "Corporate Political Strategies: A Review and Research Agenda." Journal of Management 837-857.
 * 2) Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman 2001. Special Interest Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press)
 * 3) Snyder, James M. (1991). “On Buying Legislators,” Economics and Politics, July 1991, vol. 3, no. 2, pages 93-109.

Empirical

 * 1) de Figueiredo, John M., and Brian S. Silverman (2006). “Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying,” //Journal of Law and Economics// 49(2): 597-625.
 * 2) Snyder, James M. (1990). “Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives 1980-1986,” //Journal of Political Economy//, December 1990, vol. 98, no. 6, pages 1195-1227.
 * 3) Stratmann, Thomas (1992). “Are Contributors Rational: Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees,” //Journal of Political Economy//, June 1990.
 * 4) Bonardi, J. P.; Holburn, G.; Vanden Bergh, R. G. 2006. “Non Market Strategy in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Electric Utilities,” //Academy of Management Journal// 49(6).

Theory

 * 1) Baron, David P., and Daniel Diermeier. 2007. “Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy,” //Journal of Economics and Management Strategy// 16(3): 599-634.
 * 2) Baron, David P. 2005. “Competing for the Public Through the Media,” //Journal of Economics and Management Strategy// 14(2): 339-376.
 * 3) Gilligan, Thomas, and Tim Feddersen (2001). “Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods,” //Journal of Economics and Management Strategy// 10(1): 149-71.
 * 4) Simcoe, T.S. (2009). “Standard Setting Committees” Working Paper, University of Toronto.

Empirical

 * 1) Groseclose, Timothy, and Jeff Milyo. 2005. “A Measure of Media Bias,” //Quarterly Journal of Economics// 120(4): 1191-1237.
 * 2)  Eric Uhlmann, George Newman, Victoria Brescoll, Adam Galinksy, and Daniel Diermeier. 2008. “  ** [|The Sounds of Silence: Effects of an Engaged, Defensive, and No Comment Response to a Crisis on Corporate Reputation] .”  **  Northwestern University Working Paper.

Theory

 * 1) Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini 2000. //Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy// (Cambridge: MIT Press)
 * 2) Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson 2006. //Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy//. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Strategic Action by Firms

 * 1) Levy, Brian and Pablo T. Spiller "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation" //Journal of Law, Economics and Organization// 10: 201-246.
 * 2) Henisz, Witold J. 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth." //Economics and Politics// 12(1):1-31.
 * 3) Tsebelis, George. 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis." //American Political Science Review//. 93(3): 591-608
 * 4) Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2002. //Predicting Politics// (Columbus: Ohio State University Press)