Bibliography+-+Org+Form+-+Selection+&+Cons

FOUNDATIONAL

 * 1) Coase, R. 1937. The nature of the firm. //Economica N.S.,// 4: 386-405
 * 2) Chandler, A. 1962. //Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of Industrial Enterprise//. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, esp. Chapters 1, 2, 6 and 7.
 * 3) Klein, B., R. Crawford and A. Alchian. 1978. Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. //Journal of Law and Economics//, 21: 297-326.
 * 4) Armour, H. and D. Teece. 1978. Organizational structure and economic performance. //Bell Journal of Economics//, 9: 106-122.
 * 5) Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: A theory of embeddedness. //American Journal of Sociology//, 91: 481-510.
 * 6) Grossman, S. and O. Hart. 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of lateral and vertical integration. //Journal of Political Economy//, 91: 907-928.
 * 7) Williamson, O. E. 1991. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives. //Administrative Science Quarterly//, 36: 269-296.

Internal Organization:

 * 1) Fligstein, N. 1985. The spread of the multidivisional form among large firms, 1919-1979. //American Sociological Review//, 50: 377-391.
 * 2) Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts. 1988. An economic approach to influence activities in organizations. //American Journal of Sociology//, 94: S174-S179.
 * 3) Zenger, T. 1994. Explaining organizational diseconomies of scale in research and development: Agency problems and the allocation of engineering talent, ideas and effort by firm size. //Management Science//, 40: 708-729.
 * 4) Holmström, B. and P. Milgrom. 1994. The firm as an incentive system. //American Economic Review//, 84: 972-991.
 * 5) Argyres, N. 1995. Technology strategy, governance structure, and interdivisional coordination. //Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,// 28: 337-358.

**Vertical Integration:**

 * 1) Chandler, A. 1977. //The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business.// Cambridge, MA//:// Belknap Press.
 * 2) Monteverde, K. and D. Teece. 1982. Supplier switching costs and vertical integration in the automobile industry. //Bell Journal of Economics//, 13: 206-213.
 * 3) Masten, S. 1984. The organization of production: Evidence from the aerospace industry. //Journal of Law and Economics//, 27: 403-418.
 * 4) Masten, S., J. Meehan, and E. Snyder. 1991. The costs of organization. //Journal of Law, Economics and Organization//, 7: 1-22.
 * 5) Poppo, L. and Zenger, T. 1998. Testing alternative theories of the firm: Transaction cost, knowledge-based, and measurement explanations for make-or-buy decisions in IT Services. //Strategic Management Journal//, 19: 853-877.
 * 6) Nickerson, J. and B. Silverman. 2003. Why firms want to organize efficiently and what keeps them from doing so: Inappropriate governance, performance and adaptation in a deregulated industry. //Administrative Science Quarterly//, 48: 433:465

Alliances:

 * 1) D. Teece. 1986. Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for collaboration, licensing and public policy. //Research Policy,// 15: 285-305.
 * 2) G. Pisano. 1989. Using equity participation to support exchange: Evidence from the biotechnology industry. //Journal of Law, Economics and Organization//, 5: 109-126.
 * 3) Gulati, R. 1995. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. //Academy of Management Journal//, 38: 85-112.
 * 4) Oxley, J. 1997. Appropriability hazards and governance in alliances: A transaction cost approach. //Journal of Law, Economics and Organization//, 13: 387-409.
 * 5) Sampson, R. 2004. The cost of misaligned governance in R&D alliances. //Journal of Law, Economics and Organization//, 20: 484-526.
 * 6) Contract structure:
 * 7) Macaulay, S. 1963. Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary study. //American Sociological Review//, 28: 55-67.
 * 8) Joskow, P. 1987. Contract duration and relationship-specific investments: Empirical evidence from coal markets. //American Economic Review//, 77: 168-185.
 * 9) Poppo, L. and T. Zenger. 2002. Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? //Strategic Management Journal//, 23: 707-726.
 * 10) Mayer, K. and N. Argyres. 2004. Learning to contract: Evidence from the personal computer industry. //Organization Science//, 5: 394-410.
 * 11) Ryall, M. & Sampson, R. 2009. Formal contracts in the presence of relational enforcement mechanisms: Evidence from technology development projects. //Management Science,// 55(6):906-25.