(back to Organizational Form: Selection and Consequences)

FOUNDATIONAL

  1. Coase, R. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica N.S., 4: 386-405
  2. Chandler, A. 1962. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, esp. Chapters 1, 2, 6 and 7.
  3. Klein, B., R. Crawford and A. Alchian. 1978. Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics, 21: 297-326.
  4. Armour, H. and D. Teece. 1978. Organizational structure and economic performance. Bell Journal of Economics, 9: 106-122.
  5. Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: A theory of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-510.
  6. Grossman, S. and O. Hart. 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of lateral and vertical integration. Journal of Political Economy, 91: 907-928.
  7. Williamson, O. E. 1991. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: 269-296.

SECONDARY

Internal Organization:

  1. Fligstein, N. 1985. The spread of the multidivisional form among large firms, 1919-1979. American Sociological Review, 50: 377-391.
  2. Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts. 1988. An economic approach to influence activities in organizations. American Journal of Sociology, 94: S174-S179.
  3. Zenger, T. 1994. Explaining organizational diseconomies of scale in research and development: Agency problems and the allocation of engineering talent, ideas and effort by firm size. Management Science, 40: 708-729.
  4. Holmström, B. and P. Milgrom. 1994. The firm as an incentive system. American Economic Review, 84: 972-991.
  5. Argyres, N. 1995. Technology strategy, governance structure, and interdivisional coordination. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 28: 337-358.


Vertical Integration:

  1. Chandler, A. 1977. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
  2. Monteverde, K. and D. Teece. 1982. Supplier switching costs and vertical integration in the automobile industry. Bell Journal of Economics, 13: 206-213.
  3. Masten, S. 1984. The organization of production: Evidence from the aerospace industry. Journal of Law and Economics, 27: 403-418.
  4. Masten, S., J. Meehan, and E. Snyder. 1991. The costs of organization. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7: 1-22.
  5. Poppo, L. and Zenger, T. 1998. Testing alternative theories of the firm: Transaction cost, knowledge-based, and measurement explanations for make-or-buy decisions in IT Services. Strategic Management Journal, 19: 853-877.
  6. Nickerson, J. and B. Silverman. 2003. Why firms want to organize efficiently and what keeps them from doing so: Inappropriate governance, performance and adaptation in a deregulated industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48: 433:465

Alliances:

  1. D. Teece. 1986. Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research Policy, 15: 285-305.
  2. G. Pisano. 1989. Using equity participation to support exchange: Evidence from the biotechnology industry. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 5: 109-126.
  3. Gulati, R. 1995. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38: 85-112.
  4. Oxley, J. 1997. Appropriability hazards and governance in alliances: A transaction cost approach. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 13: 387-409.
  5. Sampson, R. 2004. The cost of misaligned governance in R&D alliances. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 20: 484-526.
  6. Contract structure:
  7. Macaulay, S. 1963. Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary study. American Sociological Review, 28: 55-67.
  8. Joskow, P. 1987. Contract duration and relationship-specific investments: Empirical evidence from coal markets. American Economic Review, 77: 168-185.
  9. Poppo, L. and T. Zenger. 2002. Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23: 707-726.
  10. Mayer, K. and N. Argyres. 2004. Learning to contract: Evidence from the personal computer industry. Organization Science, 5: 394-410.
  11. Ryall, M. & Sampson, R. 2009. Formal contracts in the presence of relational enforcement mechanisms: Evidence from technology development projects. Management Science, 55(6):906-25.